Este trabalho busca analisar de que maneira processos de liberalização comercial podem afetar a distribuição de renda e a pobreza no Brasil. A análise é conduzida através de um modelo Aplicado de Equilíbrio Geral estático, ligado a um modelo de microsimulação, calibrado com dados da PNAD 2001. O modelo distingue 112.055 famílias e 263.938 adultos, 42 atividades produtivas, 52 produtos, e 27 regiões dentro do Brasil. A Rodada Doha de liberalização comercial é simulada, e seus impactos sobre a pobreza e a distribuição de renda no Brasil analisado. Os resultados sugerem que mesmo choques de liberalização grandes como os aqui simulados não teriam grande impacto na redução da pobreza no país, embora os mais pobres fossem os maiores beneficiados.
were wage by industry and region, as well as other personal characteristics such as years of schooling, sex, age, position in the family, and other socio-economic characteristics.
The POF, on the other hand, is an expenditure survey that covers 11 metropolitan regions in Brazil. It was undertaken during 1996, and covered 16,014 households, with the purpose of updating the consumption bundle structure. The main information we drew from this survey was the expenditure patterns of 10 different income classes, for the 11 regions. We assigned one such pattern to each individual PNAD household, according to each income class. As for the regional dimension, the 11 POF regions were mapped to the larger set of 27 CGE regions. Here it must be stressed that the POF survey just brings information about urban areas (the metropolitan areas of the main state capitals).
Model running procedures and highlights.
As mentioned before, our model consists of two main parts: a Computable General Equilibrium model (CGE) and a Household Model (MS). The models are run sequentially. To ensure consistency between the two models we have two strategies: • The CGE model is sufficiently detailed, and its categories and data are close enough to those of the MS model that the CGE model predicts MS behavior (that is also included in the CGE model, such as household demands or labor supplies) very closely. The role of the MS model is to provide extra information, for example about the variance of income within income groups, or about the incidence of price and wage changes upon groups not identified by the CGE model, such as groups identified by ethnic type, educational level, or family status.
• If the MS model predicts household demands or labor supplies at variance with the CGE model we have the option of feeding back corrections into the CGE model, and running the two models iteratively until they agree. That option was not exercised in the simulations reported here 6 . We start with a set of trade shocks generated by a GTAP model simulation that excludes the effect of Brazil's own tariff reductions (described bellow). These shocks consist of changes in import prices, in export demands, and in Brazilian tariff rates. Import prices and tariffs are naturally exogenous to the Brazil model. We apply the export demand changes via vertical shifts in the export demand curves facing Brazil.
The trade shocks are applied, and the results calculated to 52 commodities, 42 industries, 10 households and 10 labor occupations --all of which vary by 27 regions. Next, the results from the CGE model are used to update the MS model. At first, this update consists basically in updating wages and hours worked for the 263,938 workers in the sample. These changes have a regional (27 regions) as well as sectoral (42 industries) dimension. The model then relocates jobs according to changes in labor demand 7 . This is done by changing the PNAD weight of each worker in order to mimic the change in employment --we call this the "quantum weights method" 8 . In this approach, then, there is a true job relocation process going on.
One final point about the procedure used in this paper should be stressed. Although the changes in the labor market are simulated for each adult in the labor force, the changes in expenditures and in poverty are tracked back to the household dimension. This is possible since PNAD has a key that links persons to households. Each household contains one or more adults, either working in a particular sector and occupation, or unemployed, as well as dependents. In our model then it is possible to recompose changes in the household income from the changes in individual wages. This is a very important aspect of the model, since it is likely that family incomes are cushioned, in general, by this procedure. If, for example, one person in some household loses his job but another in the same household gets a new job, household income may change little. Since households are the expenditure units in the model, we would expect household spending to be cushioned by this income pooling effect. On the other hand, the loss of a job will increase poverty more if the displaced worker is the sole earner in a household.
THE BASE YEAR PICTURE
In this section we extend the above description of poverty and income inequality in Brazil. The reference year for our analysis is 2001. Some general aggregated information about poverty and income inequality in Brazil can be seen in Table 1 .
The rows of Table 1 correspond to household income classes, grouped according to POF definitions 9 , such that POF[1] is the lowest income class, and POF [10] the highest. A fair picture of income inequality in Brazil emerges from the table. We see that the first 5 income classes, while accounting for 52.6 percent of total population in Brazil, get only 17 percent of total income. The highest income class, on the other hand, accounts for 11 percent of population, and about 45 percent of total income. The Gini index associated with the income distribution in Brazil in 2001, calculated using an equivalent household 10 basis, is 0.58, placing Brazil's income distribution among the world's worst. Total 100.0 100.0 ---------------PrPop = % in total population; PrInc = % in country total income; AveHouInc = average household income; UnempRate = unemployment rate; PrWhite = % of white population in total; AveWage = average normalized wage; PrChild = share of population under 15 by income class. Source: PNAD, 2001.
The unemployment rate is also relatively higher among the poorer classes. This is a very important point to be noted, due to its relevance for modeling. The opportunity to get a new job is probably the most important element lifting people out of poverty: hence the importance for poverty modeling of allowing the model to capture the existence of a switching regime (from unemployment to employment), and not just changes in wages. As can be seen in Table 1 above, the unemployment rate reaches 36.5 percent among the lowest income group (persons above 15 years), and just 7.7 percent among the richest. The percentage of white people also increases considerably with household income, while the percentage of children decreases markedly. Although the analysis does not specifically focus in gender and ethnical aspects, these are important indicators to take into account when analyzing results. FGT0: the proportion of poor households below the poverty line; FGT1: the average poverty gap; FGT2: extent of inequality among the poor. Table 2 shows a large average poverty gap for the two lowest income classes. Together these two income classes contribute to about half of the general average poverty gap index of the economy. The first income class, for example, falls below the poverty line by about 70%. Thus, large income increases for the poor are needed to significantly change the number in poverty.
As stated before, this general poverty and inequality picture also has an important regional dimension in Brazil --because economic activity is located mainly in the SouthEast region. This is particularly true of manufacturing; agriculture is more dispersed among regions. Table 3 shows more information about the regional variation of poverty and income inequality. As it can be seen, the states in the North (N) region account for 8 percent of total population, compared to 23.5 percent for the North-East (NE), 45 percent in the South-East (SE), 16 percent for South (S), and 7.2 percent for the Center-West (CW). In the SE region the state of São Paulo alone accounts for 22.9 percent of total Brazilian population.
The fourth column in Table 3 shows the share of households below the poverty line in each region, as a proportion of total regional households. The states in the NE region 14 . These figures are the contribution of each state to the total poverty gap index in Brazil expressed as a proportion of the poverty line (see column total). We can see that the average poverty gap in Brazil in 2001 is a 14.5 percent insufficiency of income to reach the poverty line. state (in the North region) shows a poverty gap in line with the richer states of the S-SE. This result, however, should be viewed with caution, since that state has a very small share of total population and the result could be due to sampling bias. The PNAD survey does not cover the rural areas of the Northern states, where poverty is usually concentrated. More information about the labor structure of the economy can be seen in Table 4 In Table 4 sectoral wage bills are split into the model's 10 occupational groups. The occupational groups are defined in terms of a unit wage ranking. More skilled workers, then, would be those in the highest income classes, and vice-versa. As it can be seen, Agriculture is the activity that uses more unskilled labor (40.5 percent of that sector's labor bill), while Petroleum and Gas Extraction and Petroleum Refinery are the most intensive users of skilled labor (10 th labor class) using activities, with Financial Institutions coming next. If labor inputs were measured in hours (rather than in values) the concentration of low-skill labor in Agriculture would be even more pronounced.
Agriculture is also the sector that hires most unskilled labor in Brazil, around 41 percent of total workers in income class 1. The Trade sector is the second largest employer of this type of labor. As for the higher income classes, we see that the Financial Institutions and Public Administration sectors hire the largest numbers of well-paid workers.
THE SIMULATIONS
The simulations will draw on previous global results generated by Anderson and Martin (2005) . The global results from alternative scenarios are transmitted to the Brazilian model, and the impacts over poverty and income distribution examined. Three main simulations will be analyzed:
• Doha1 scenario: cuts in agricultural tariffs, cuts in domestic support for OECD agriculture, 50 percent proportional cuts in non-agricultural tariffs for richer countries, 30 percent for developing countries, and 0 percent for least developed countries.
• Doha2 scenario: Doha 1 plus elimination of special and differential treatment for developing countries.
• Fullib scenario: global free trade scenario.
Model closure
In choosing a model closure we aimed to mimic the GTAP model that generated the foreign price scenario. On the supply side, we fixed total national employment by occupation, with labor moving freely across sectors 15 . The model allows substitution between occupations, driven by relative wages. Similarly capital is fixed nationally but is mobile between sectors and regions. Land stocks (used just in the Agriculture activity) are fixed in each sector.
On the demand side government and investment spending are fixed 16 , and a fixed trade balance enforces the national budget balance, which is accommodated by changes in real consumption. The trade balance, then, drives the level of absorption. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is the model's numeraire.
Finally, tax revenue losses due to tariff cuts are replaced: real aggregate revenue from all indirect taxes is kept fixed, via a uniform endogenous change in the power of indirect taxes on sales to households. This mechanism is equivalent to a lump sum tax, of value proportional to each household's spending 17 . It also mimics the traditional method of raising tax revenues in Brazil, through indirect tax collection.
RESULTS

The CGE model results
The Brazilian economy is little oriented to external trade. The shares of exports and imports in total GDP were respectively 7.0 percent and 8.9 percent in the 1996 base year. These shares have increased recently, but not by enough to significantly change this picture 18 .
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As stated before, the shocks applied to the model were generated by a previous run of the GTAP model, where the Doha scenarios were implemented. The GTAP effects XLIII CONGRESSO DA SOBER "Instituições, Eficiência, Gestão e Contratos no Sistema Agroindustrial" on the Brazilian economy were then transmitted to the Brazil CGE model through tariffs and import prices changes, and shifts in the demand schedules for the Brazilian exports 19 . An inspection of Table 5 can give an idea of the importance of these shocks. Brazilian exports are spread among many different commodities, with no specialized trend. Raw agricultural products have very small share in total exports, composed almost entirely of soybeans. Processed food and agricultural-based exports (including Wood and Furniture, Rubber, Paper, Textiles and Apparel), however, account for a significant 0.369 share of total exports in the base year, highlighting the importance of Agriculture in the Brazilian economy.
Imports as a share of each domestic production are concentrated in Wheat, Oil, Machinery, Electric Materials and Electronic Equipment, and Chemical Products. In terms of total import shares, however, Oil Products (Raw and Refined), Machinery, Electric Materials and Electronic Equipment, and Chemical Products are the most important products.
In terms of the relevant parameters the Armington elasticities are borrowed from the GTAP database. The same is true for the export demand elasticities (not shown here), made equal to the GTAP region-generic elasticity of substitution among imports in the Armington structure. The Agriculture sector is modeled as a multiproduction sector, producing 11 commodities. Thus the capital/labor ratio is the same for every agricultural product. In what follows, we present some macro results in order to establish a benchmark for the regional and poverty analysis. When interpreting these results one should bear in mind that the model has a "top-down" inter-regional specification, meaning that regional results depend on national results, but not viceversa. National macro results can be seen in Table 6 . Because the closure fixes total supply of all primary factors (land, labor and capital), GDP shows only a slight increase in all simulations. The real exchange rate rises (revaluation) as a result of the shocks, with corresponding gains in the external terms of trade.
For factor market results, recall that land is fixed by sector, while capital and labor are fixed nationally, but mobile between sectors. As we can see, the average (aggregated) capital rental increases in all scenarios. With capital stocks and labor fixed in total, the expanding industries would attract capital and labor from the contracting ones. In these industries those with falling capital/labor ratios increase the marginal productivity of capital, and hence capital returns, determining an increase in aggregated results. The price of land also shows a strong increase, reflecting the increase in production of activities using this factor (Agriculture). National changes in industry output are shown in Table 7 .
As can be seen in Table 7 , expanding industries in all scenarios are Agriculture and agricultural related industries (the food industry in general). The only exception is the Vegetable Oils industry that contracts in scenario 3. Model results show a general fall in activity in the Brazilian manufacturing sectors following the trade liberalization. This suggests that regions specializing in manufacturing would fare worse. The results are similar across the first two scenarios, and just differ in size (but not sign), when compared with the third scenario of full trade liberalization, with a few exceptions. Table 8 shows regional results. In this table, states are grouped according to their macro-regions inside Brazil. With total employment fixed, labor demand will be distributed among regions according to their respective industry's activity level changes. Employment falls in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in the Southeast region (the most populous and industrialized states), and also in Amazonas, DF (Brasilia) and Amapa.
The states of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro are industrial states, hosting the bulk of Brazil's manufacturing. As seen before, manufacturing is contracting in general, in all three scenarios. The same effect drives the result for the Amazonas state, where there is a Free Exporting Zone, while reduced mining activity drives the results for Amapa state.
Interestingly, the trade liberalization scenarios seem to redistribute economic activity towards poorer regions. However, this occurs because higher value-added sectors (manufacturing) shrink, and relatively lower value-added sectors (agriculture) grow. 
Poverty and income distribution results
We saw in the previous section that model results are differentiated among regions and industries. The outcome of these changes on income and income inequality measures as well as over each household particular Consumer Price Index are presented in Table 9 and discussed below. In this These results confirm the general understanding that the GINI index usually changes very little with policy measures in the short run, and accord with observed facts in Brazil in the last 15 years. Even though the country faced a strong trade liberalization process in the nineties, it was observed that the GINI index changed very little in the period.
The CPI column in each scenario is the particular CPI change for each household income class, since the consumption bundle of each class is different. It is interesting to note that the bulk of the real income effect comes from the income generation side, and not from the fall in prices. Actually, there is a strong increase in some food products, like meats, in all scenarios, driven mainly by the liberalization in the rest of the world. This is in contrast with what was expected by Rocha (1998) , mentioned before, who expected that opening the Brazilian economy to the external market would help reduce inequality in Brazil through reductions in prices in the poorest regions. Our results suggest that the CPI would actually go up more in the lowest income classes, but are more than compensated by the income elevation.
An important point to note is that the highest positive changes in household income are concentrated on the lowest income households, decreasing monotonically as household income increases. Indeed, as can be seen in Table 10 below, the reduction in the number of poor households is concentrated in the poorest groups. High positive figures in POF groups 7 and 8 are percentage changes over very low numbers, since there are very few poor households in these income classes 20 . It is interesting to note that scenarios Doha1 and Doha2 are very much the same, in terms of their impact on poverty and income inequality measures. The Doha2 inclusion of deeper trade liberalization for developing countries, compared to Doha1, would not generate any significant change for Brazil.
The headcount ratio index (FGT0 in Table 10 ) captures only the extension of poverty, but is insensitive to its intensity (Hoffmann, 1998) . The change in the intensity of poverty can be seen through the FGT1 index, the insufficiency of income ratio. A reduction in Ribeirão Preto, 24 a 27 de Julho de 2005 Sociedade Brasileira de Economia e Sociologia Rural FTG1 means a reduction in the severity of poverty inside each household income class. As seen from Table 10 , the FGT1 index decreases more than the headcount ratio in all scenarios. This means that there was actually an income distribution improvement, but not enough to drive a large number of persons (or households) out of poverty. This is due to the high value of those indices in the base year, as noted before. FGT0: Foster-Greer-Torbecke proportion of poor households index, or headcount ratio. FGT1: poverty gap ratio.
We also computed separately (but do not tabulate here) the effects on Brazil of its own liberalization (assuming other countries did not liberalize). The Brazilian tariff reduction contributes very little to either Doha scenario and is dominated by the other countries' actions even in the full liberalization scenario.
Finally, Table 11 shows model results relating to the regional breakdown inside Brazil. These results summarize at regional level the outcome of the simulated scenarios, as a net effect of the regional industries. They reflect, then, the pattern of regional specialization in production. As it can be seen, the states of Amazonas, Amapa, Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro would be the only ones where the number of households below the poverty line would increase in all simulations, although slightly. Amazonas and Amapa have small populations, while Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro are the most densely populated and industrialized states in Brazil. As noted before, the result is related to the high concentration of contracting (high value-added ) industries in the regions of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Amazonas, mainly Automobiles, Machinery and Tractors, Electric Materials, Electronic Equipment, and Other Vehicles and Spare Parts, while the result for Amapa is driven by the mining industries. A series of points should be highlighted in wrapping up this discussion. The model results show that even important trade policy shocks, such as those applied here, do not generate dramatic changes in the structure of Brazilian poverty and income distribution.
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The simulated effects on poverty and income distribution are positive, but very small. This highlights two points, one related to the structure of the Brazilian economy, and other to an aspect of poverty.
We noted that the Brazilian economy is not very oriented towards external trade. The domestic market is far bigger and more important for the general economy than the external market, as researchers have long understood. This makes Brazil naturally less sensitive to tariff structure changes, as well as to changes in export demands.
But we should also note that approaching poverty by the household dimension, instead of by the personal dimension, and tracking the changes in the labor market from individual workers to households is an important modeling issue. In the PNAD 2001 data we used, the head of the family income accounts for about 65 percent of aggregated household income in Brazil. Using head-of-household income as a proxy for household income may poorly predict the effect of policy changes, as convincingly argued by Bourguignon et al (2003) . If spending (and welfare) is in any sense a household phenomenon, this is the appropriate method. Even though there may be a somewhat higher computational cost associated with this procedure, it seems worthwhile.
The role played by the Agriculture sector in the analysis should also be stressed. As seen before, agriculture still accounts for a large share of employment for the poorest in Brazil. Despite the steady decline over time of agricultural employment as a share of total employment we should not overlook the importance of agricultural policy for poverty alleviation in the country.
Finally, it should be noted that this study assesses only the static impact of trade liberalization scenarios. The research methodology here used fails to capture many other effects generally associated with external trade liberalization, such as endogenous technology improvements and other dynamic effects. Indeed, our results suggest that if any strong impact over poverty is supposed to arise from trade liberalization it must be expected to arise from these other aspects.
